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This paper examines inflation dynamics in the UniteG States since 1960, with a particular focus on
the Great Recession. A puzzle emerges when Phillips curves estimated over 1960-2007 are used to
predict inflation over 2008-2010:  inflation should have fallen by more than it did. We resolve this
puzzle with two modifications of the Phillips curve, both suggested by theories of costly price adjustment:
we measure core inflation with the median CPI inflation rate, and we allow the slope of the Phillips
curve to change with the level and variance of inflation. We then examine the hypothesis of anchored
inflation expectations. We find that expectations have been fully "shock-anchored" since the 1980s,
while "level anchoring" has been gradual and partial, but significant. It is not clear whether expectations
are sufficiently anchored to prevent deflation over the next few years. Finally, we show that the Great
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In his Presidential Address, Friedman (1968) presented a theory of the short run behavior of
inﬂation. In Friedman’s theory, inﬂation depends on expected inﬂation and the gap between
unemployment and its natural rate. Friedman also suggested that “unanticipated inﬂation
generally means a rising rate of inﬂation”–in other words, that expected inﬂation is well-proxied
by past inﬂation. These assumptions imply an accelerationist Phillips curve that relates the
change in inﬂation to the unemployment gap.
In the decades since Friedman’s work, his model has been a workhorse of macroeconomics.
Researchers have reﬁned the model extensively; two of the numerous examples are Gordon
(1982, 1990)’s introduction of supply shocks and Staiger et al. (1997)’s modeling of a time-
varying natural rate. Economists have debated how well the accelerationist Phillips curve ﬁts
the data, some declaring the equation’s demise and others reporting that “The Phillips Curve
Is Alive and Well” (Fuhrer, 1995).
Debate over the Phillips curve has gained momentum during the U.S. economic slump that
began in 2007. Some economists see a puzzle: inﬂation has not fallen as much as a traditional
Phillips curve predicts, given the high level of unemployment. For example, in September 2010,
John Williams (now president of the San Francisco Fed) said:
“The surprise [about inﬂation] is that it’s fallen so little, given the depth and duration of the
recent downturn. Based on the experience of past severe recessions, I would have expected inﬂa-
tion to fall by twice as much as it has.”
In addition to analyzing the recent behavior of inﬂation, economists are debating its likely
path in the future. If the accelerationist Phillips curve is accurate, then high unemployment
implies a substantial risk that inﬂation will fall below zero. Yet many economists argue that
deﬂation is unlikely, primarily because the Federal Reserve’s commitment to a low but positive
inﬂation rate has “anchored” inﬂation expectations. According to Bernanke (2010),
2“Falling into deﬂation is not a signiﬁcant risk for the United States at this time, but that is
true in part because the public understands that the Federal Reserve will be vigilant and proac-
tive in addressing signiﬁcant further disinﬂation.”
This paper contributes to the debate over past and prospective inﬂation in several steps. We ﬁrst
show why it is easy to view recent inﬂation behavior as puzzling. We estimate accelerationist
Phillips curves with quarterly data for the period 1960-2007, measuring inﬂation with either
the CPI or the CPI less food and energy (XFE), the standard measure of “core” inﬂation. We
use the estimated equation and the path of unemployment over 2008-2010 to produce dynamic
forecasts of inﬂation. In these forecasts, a four-quarter moving average of core inﬂation falls to
-4.3% in 2010Q4. In reality, four-quarter core inﬂation was 0.6% in 2010Q4. A simple Phillips
curve predicts a deﬂation that did not occur.
We show, however, that two simple modiﬁcations of the Phillips curve eliminate this puzzle.
They produce a speciﬁcation that ﬁts the entire period since 1960, including the Great Reces-
sion. Both modiﬁcations are suggested by theory, speciﬁcally, models of costly nominal price
adjustment from the 1980s and 1990s.
First, following Bryan and Cecchetti (1994), we measure core inﬂation with a weighted
median of price changes across industries. This approach is motivated by price-adjustment
models in which unusually large relative-price changes cause movements in aggregate inﬂation.
Median inﬂation fell by more than XFE inﬂation from 2007 to 2010, reﬂecting a higher initial
level (in 2007, median inﬂation was about 3% and XFE inﬂation was 2%). The relatively large
fall in median inﬂation reduces the gap between forecasted and actual inﬂation.
Second, following Ball, Mankiw, and Romer (1988), we allow the slope of the Phillips curve–
the coeﬃcient on unemployment–to vary over time. In the Ball-Mankiw-Romer theory, the
Phillips curve steepens if inﬂation is high and/or variable, because these conditions reduce nom-
inal price stickiness. U.S. time series evidence strongly supports this prediction; in particular,
the Phillips curve has been relatively ﬂat in the low-inﬂation period since the mid-1980s. A
ﬂatter Phillips curve reduces the forecasted fall in inﬂation over 2008-2010. When we account
for this eﬀect and measure core inﬂation with the median price change, forecasted four-quarter
3inﬂation in 2010Q4 is 0.3%, close to the actual level of 0.5%.
After presenting these results, we turn to the idea of anchored expectations. We distinguish
between “shock anchoring,” which means that expectations do not respond to supply shocks,
and “level anchoring,” which means that expectations stay ﬁxed at a certain level regardless of
any movements in actual inﬂation. We assume this level is 2.5% for core CPI inﬂation (which
corresponds to about 2% for core PCE inﬂation). Based on the behavior of actual inﬂation and of
expectations (as measured by the Survey of Professional Forecasters), we ﬁnd that expectations
have been fully shock-anchored since the 1980s. Level anchoring has been gradual and partial,
but signiﬁcant. According to our estimates, the fraction of a change in core inﬂation that is
passed into expectations fell from roughly one in 1985 to between 0.4 and 0.7 in 2010.
Following our analysis of recent inﬂation, we forecast inﬂation over 2011-2013, using our
estimates of the Phillips curve through 2010 and CBO forecasts of unemployment and output
over the forecast period. Here, the results depend crucially on whether we incorporate anchored
expectations into our equation. Our basic accelerationist speciﬁcation, while explaining why
inﬂation is currently positive, predicts that deﬂation is on the way. In contrast, the degree of
expectation anchoring estimated for 2010 is high enough to keep inﬂation positive. We are not
conﬁdent in this forecast, however, because it assumes that expectations will stay anchored at
2.5% for several years when actual inﬂation is less than 1%.
Most of this paper examines Phillips curves in which expected inﬂation depends on past
inﬂation and possibly the Federal Reserve’s target. A large literature since the 1990s studies an
alternative, the “New Keynesian” Phillips curve based on rational expectations and the Calvo
(1983) model of staggered price adjustment. The last part of this paper asks whether the New
Keynesian Phillips curve helps explain recent inﬂation behavior; the answer is no. Indeed, the
last few years provide fresh evidence of the poor empirical performance of the model, especially
the Gali and Gertler (1999) version in which marginal cost is measured with labor’s share of
income. This speciﬁcation produces the counterfactual prediction of rising inﬂation over 2008-
2010.
Parts of our analysis overlap with other recent research on the Phillips curve, such as Fuhrer
et al. (2009), Fuhrer and Olivei (2010), and Stock and Watson (2008, 2010). We compare our
4results to previous work throughout the paper. One diﬀerence from Stock and Watson’s work is
that they focus on forecasting inﬂation in real time. In seeking to understand inﬂation behavior,
we freely use information that is not available in real time, such as the 2011 CBO series for the
natural rate of unemployment.
2 A Simple Phillips Curve and a Puzzle
We ﬁrst introduce a conventional Phillips curve, then show that it predicts a large deﬂation over
2008-2010.
2.1 The Phillips Curve
Milton Friedman’s Phillips curve can be expressed as
πt = πe
t + α(u − u∗)t + ǫt (1)
where π is annualized quarterly inﬂation, πe is expected inﬂation, u is unemployment, u∗ is the
natural rate, and ǫ is an error term that we assume is uncorrelated with u − u∗. A common
variant of this equation replaces u−u∗ with the gap between actual and potential output. Since
Friedman wrote, theorists have derived equations that are broadly similar to (1) from models in
which price setters have incomplete information (e.g. Lucas, 1973; Mankiw and Reis, 2002) or
nominal prices are sticky (e.g. Roberts, 1995).1
We follow a long tradition in applied work that assumes backward-looking expectations:
expected inﬂation is determined by past inﬂation. Speciﬁcally, we assume that expected inﬂation
1The assumption that u−u
∗ is uncorrelated with the error in the Phillips curve, implying that OLS estimates
of the equation are unbiased, is standard in the literature but rarely examined. We interpret the error term as
summarizing the eﬀects of relative price changes, which inﬂuence inﬂation when some nominal prices are sticky
(see Section 3). We assume that these relative-price eﬀects are uncorrelated with the aggregate variable u − u
∗.
We maintain this assumption when π is a measure of core inﬂation, which strips away eﬀects of relative price
changes but does so imperfectly. In this case, the error summarizes the relative-price eﬀects that are not removed
from core inﬂation.
This approach to identiﬁcation ignores the problem of measurement error. The variable u is an imperfect
measure of the activity variable in the Phillips curve, and u
∗ is an imperfect measure of the natural rate. These
problems bias our estimates of the coeﬃcient α toward zero. Future work should investigate the size of this bias
and more generally the identiﬁcation problem for the Phillips curve.




(πt−1 + πt−2 + πt−3 + πt−4) + α(u − u∗)t + ǫt (2)
This equation is a special case of Phillips curves estimated by Gordon and Stock-Watson, which
generally include lags of unemployment and lags of inﬂation with unrestricted coeﬃcients (except
for the accelerationist assumption that the coeﬃcients sum to one). We keep our speciﬁcation
parsimonious along this dimension to enrich it more easily along others (for example, by allow-
ing time-variation in the coeﬃcient α). We examine versions of equation (2) with richer lag
structures as part of our robustness checks.
The structure of inﬂation lags in equation (2) implies that a one-percentage-point increase
in unemployment for one quarter changes inﬂation in the long run by 0.4 times the coeﬃcient
α. The long run eﬀect of one point of unemployment sustained for a year is 1.6 times α.
The structure of inﬂation lags in equation (2) implies that a one-percentage-point increase
in unemployment for one quarter changes inﬂation in the long run by 0.4 times the coeﬃcient
α. The long run eﬀect of one point of unemployment sustained for a year is 1.6 times α.2
Our empirical work requires a series for the natural rate of unemployment or for potential
output. For most of our analysis, we use estimates of these variables from the Congressional
Budget Oﬃce; as a robustness check, we estimate a path for the natural rate using a technique
from Staiger et al. (1997). The CBO natural-rate series is similar to estimates from other sources:
the natural rate rises modestly in the 1960s and 1970s, from about 5.5% to 6.3%, then falls to
5.0% in the 1990s. It remains at 5.0% through 2007, then rises slightly to 5.2% in 2010.
Since Gordon (1982), many empirical researchers add “supply shocks” to the Phillips curve.
Others seek to ﬁlter supply shocks out of the dependent variable with measures of core inﬂation.
The most common supply shocks are changes in the relative prices of food and energy, and the
standard core-inﬂation measure is inﬂation less food and energy. Most of this paper examines
core inﬂation, but we experiment with alternative measures of this variable.
2The easiest way to derive this result is to numerically calculate the path of inﬂation following an increase in
unemployment.
62.2 The Puzzle
We now take our ﬁrst pass at estimating the Phillips curve. We want to know whether equation
(2) ﬁts inﬂation behavior since 1960, and especially whether anything has changed during the
Great Recession. The starting date of 1960 is based on Barsky (1987), who ﬁnds a regime change
in the univariate behavior of inﬂation at that point, from a stationary process to an IMA(1,1)
(a process that still captures inﬂation behavior, albeit with time-varying parameters, according
to Stock and Watson, 2010).
We estimate equation (2) for the period 1960-2007, ending the sample at the start of the Great
Recession. We examine two measures of inﬂation, one derived from the CPI (total inﬂation) and
one from the CPI excluding food and energy (XFE inﬂation). In each case we average monthly
data on the price level to create quarterly price levels, then compute annualized percentage
changes from quarter to quarter. For each inﬂation variable, we estimate a Phillips curve that
includes the unemployment gap and one that includes the output gap.
Table 1 presents our regression results. For both measures of inﬂation, the coeﬃcients
on unemployment are about -0.5 and are highly signiﬁcant statistically (t > 5). The output
coeﬃcients are around 0.25, which accords with the unemployment coeﬃcients and Okun’s Law.
Recall that one point-year of unemployment or output changes long-run inﬂation by 1.6
times the variable’s coeﬃcient. For example, in the equation with XFE inﬂation and output,
the estimated coeﬃcient implies an eﬀect of approximately (1.6)(0.25) = 0.4 percentage points.
Equivalently, the sacriﬁce ratio for reducing inﬂation is 1
0.4 = 2.5. This result is in the ballpark
of previous estimates of U.S. sacriﬁce ratios (e.g., Ball, 1994).
Next, we perform dynamic forecasts of inﬂation over 2008-2010. We start with actual inﬂa-
tion through 2007 and feed the path of unemployment over 2008-2010 into the estimated Phillips
curves in Table 1. Figure 1 compares the forecasted and actual levels of total inﬂation (Panel A)
and XFE inﬂation (Panel B). We present four-quarter moving averages so we can ignore some
of the transitory ﬂuctuations in quarterly data.
Figure 1 illustrates why some economists think the Phillips curve has broken down recently.
Actual XFE inﬂation, for example, fell from 2.6% in 2007Q4 to 0.4% in 2010Q4. In the dynamic
forecasts, XFE inﬂation falls to -5.5% for the unemployment equation and -4.1% for the output
7equation. The pre-2008 Phillips curve predicts a deﬂation that didn’t occur.
3 Measuring Core Inﬂation
Here we compare alternative measures of core inﬂation. We start by discussing supply shocks,
the ﬂuctuations in inﬂation that core measures are meant to ﬁlter out.
3.1 Measuring Supply Shocks
The Phillips curve in much applied work is Gordon’s “triangle model.” It explains total inﬂation
with three factors: expected inﬂation, aggregate activity, and supply shocks. The most common
measures of supply shocks are changes in the relative prices of food and energy. Since the 1970s,
these variables have added greatly to the R
2s of estimated Phillips curves.
Yet, theoretically, it is not obvious why certain relative prices should inﬂuence inﬂation–why
it depends on food and energy prices rather than, say, the prices of clothing and home appliances.
As Friedman (1975) asked, “Why should the average level of prices be aﬀected signiﬁcantly by
changes in the price of some things relative to others?”
A number of economists answer this question with models of nominal price stickiness. Many,
ranging from the Dornbusch and Fischer (1990) text to Blanchard and Gali (2008), assume that
food and energy prices are ﬂexible and other prices are sticky. In this setting, a shock that
raises the relative prices of food and energy does so by increasing their nominal prices while
other prices stay constant. This pattern of adjustment implies an increase in the aggregate price
level.
Ball and Mankiw (1995) present a theory of supply shocks based on a diﬀerent sticky-price
model. Rather than assume certain industries have sticky or ﬂexible prices, Ball and Mankiw
make price adjustment endogenous. Firms receive shocks to their equilibrium relative prices and
choose whether to pay a menu cost and adjust prices. In each period, the ﬁrms that receive the
largest shocks are most likely to adjust.
The upshot is that inﬂation depends on the distribution of price changes across industries.
If the distribution is skewed to the right, for example, that means many ﬁrms have desired
8price increases that are large enough to trigger adjustment, and relatively few have large enough
negative shocks to adjust. As a result, the aggregate price level rises. Based on this result,
Ball and Mankiw measure supply shocks with the skewness of relative price changes and other
measures of asymmetry.
In practice, the competing measures of supply shocks–food and energy prices and asymme-
tries in price distributions–are positively correlated. The reason is that, in many periods, large
changes in food and energy prices create large tails in price distributions. Yet there is enough
independent variation in supply-shock measures to see which are most closely related to inﬂa-
tion. For the period 1949 to 1989, Ball and Mankiw show that only price-change asymmetries,
not changes in food and energy prices, are signiﬁcant when both are included in a Phillips curve.
3.2 From Supply Shocks to Core Inﬂation
We deﬁne core inﬂation as the part of inﬂation not explained by supply shocks, but rather
by expected inﬂation and economic activity–the two other parts of the triangle. With this
deﬁnition, one can measure core inﬂation by removing the eﬀects of supply shocks from total
inﬂation. This approach follows common practice. When researchers measure supply shocks
with changes in food and energy prices, they measure core inﬂation with XFE inﬂation, which
strips away the direct eﬀects of food and energy.
If supply shocks are asymmetries in the distribution of price changes, then a measure of
core inﬂation should eliminate the eﬀects of these asymmetries. A simple measure, proposed by
Bryan and Cecchetti (1994), is the weighted median of price changes across industries (median
inﬂation).
Researchers sometimes evaluate core inﬂation measures by their ability to forecast future
inﬂation. In theory, core inﬂation as we deﬁne it might not be a good forecaster. A rise in total
inﬂation caused by a supply shock might raise expected inﬂation, which in turn raises future
inﬂation; in that case, total inﬂation would be a better forecaster than core inﬂation. In practice,
however, papers such as Sommer (2004) and Hooker (2002) ﬁnd that, since the 1980s, supply
shocks have not fed strongly into future inﬂation; thus, core inﬂation is a good forecaster. We
return to this point when we discuss the anchoring of inﬂation expectations.
9Smith (2004) compares median inﬂation and XFE inﬂation as forecasters of total inﬂation
over 1984-1997. She ﬁnds that forecasts based on median inﬂation are more accurate.
3.3 Measuring Median Inﬂation
The Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland maintains a monthly series for median inﬂation that
begins in 1968. The economy is disaggregated into about forty industries (the number rises
from 36 to 45 over time), and core inﬂation is measured by the weighted median of industry
inﬂation rates, using the industries’ weights in the CPI.
The data include an “original” weighted median for 1968-2007 and a “revised” median for
1983 to the present. The main diﬀerence is that the original data include owner’s equivalent
rent (OER) as the price for one large industry, while the revised data include OER for four
geographic regions. This revision makes some diﬀerence because the change in OER (in the
original data) or one of the regional changes (in the revised data) is the median price change
for around half of the observations. For the period when the two median series overlap, the
diﬀerences are modest, although the original series shows somewhat greater monthly volatility.
For more documentation of the Cleveland Fed data, see Bryan and Pike (1991) and Bryan et al.
(1997).3
We compute quarterly data for median inﬂation that matches the timing of our quarterly
series for total and XFE inﬂation. We ﬁrst use the monthly median inﬂation rates from the
Cleveland Fed to construct a monthly series for price levels. Then we average three months to
get a quarterly price level, and compute annualized percentage changes in that variable.4
The time-aggregation of median inﬂation is not straightforward. Instead of our approach, one
could measure the median of quarterly price changes across industries; in principle, this median
3Some economists (including one of our discussants) question median CPI as an inﬂation measure because the
median price change in the Cleveland Fed data is often one of the regional OERs. It is not clear to us why the
validity of the Cleveland Fed’s approach depends on which industry is the median. Nonetheless, as a robustness
check, we have constructed median non-housing inﬂation by discarding the regional OERs and computing the
median price change for all other industries. A four-quarter average of this series falls by 2.1 percentage points
between 2007Q4 and 2010Q4 (from 3.1% to 1.0%); the fall in the Cleveland Fed’s median, 2.6 percentage points,
is somewhat larger. Yet housing prices have a greater eﬀect on the other leading measure of core inﬂation, XFE.
This variable falls by 1.7 percentage points between 2007Q4 and 2010Q4; if the OERs are removed along with
food and energy, the resulting inﬂation measure falls by only 0.9 percentage points.
4The Cleveland Fed website provides a diﬀerent measure of quarterly inﬂation: the average of median inﬂation
over the three months of the quarter.
10might diﬀer greatly from the quarterly variable that we construct from monthly medians. This
non-robustness arises because the median is not a linear function of industry price changes.
Future research might compare measures of median inﬂation based on diﬀerent frequencies for
industry-level data.
3.4 Some New Evidence
We present one new piece of evidence on the measurement of core inﬂation. Both expected
inﬂation and the activity gap are persistent series, and hence the part of inﬂation they determine–
core inﬂation–is persistent. One should not expect signiﬁcant transitory movements in quarterly
core inﬂation. Therefore, one criterion for judging core inﬂation measures is the extent that their
movements are permanent or transitory.
We implement this idea with Stock and Watson (2007)’s procedure for decomposing inﬂation
into permanent and transitory components. Stock and Watson assume that inﬂation is the
sum of a permanent, random-walk component and a transitory, white-noise component. This
speciﬁcation implies that aggregate inﬂation follows an IMA(1,1) process. Stock and Watson
allow the variances of the permanent and transitory shocks to change over time. They estimate
series for the permanent component of inﬂation and the variances of the two shocks.
We apply the Stock-Watson procedure to the two competing measures of core inﬂation,
XFE inﬂation and median inﬂation. Figure 2 shows the quarterly series for these two variables
and their estimated permanent components. The sample starts in 1983Q2, when the “revised”
median data begin. The divergences between total and permanent inﬂation–the transitory
shocks–are smaller when inﬂation is measured by median inﬂation. This diﬀerence is especially
pronounced in the 2000s, when median inﬂation appears to have almost no transitory component.
These results bolster the case for measuring core inﬂation with the median.
The two core measures behave diﬀerently because price changes that are large relative to
aggregate inﬂation–annualized monthly changes of 20% or more–occur frequently in industries
besides food and energy. Some of these industries, such as used cars and lodging away from
home, may be aﬀected indirectly by energy prices. Women’s apparel is an example of a non-
energy-related industry with volatile prices. Large price changes in all these industries cause
11transitory movements in XFE inﬂation, but their eﬀects are ﬁltered out by the Cleveland Fed
median.
3.5 Median Inﬂation During the Great Recession
An important fact for our purposes is that median inﬂation has fallen somewhat more than
XFE inﬂation during the Great Recession. Over the period from 2007Q4 to 2010Q4, the four-
quarter moving average of median inﬂation fell from 3.1% to 0.5%, while the four-quarter moving
average of XFE inﬂation fell from 2.3% to 0.6%. Median inﬂation fell by more primarily because
it started at a higher level.
Median inﬂation was relatively high in 2007 because the distribution of price changes was
left-skewed during many months of the year. Left-skewness resulted from large price decreases
in various industries. In March 2007, for example, the prices of jewelry and watches fell at an
annualized rate of 30%, car and truck rental fell 22%, and lodging away from home fell 13%.
These price decreases reduced XFE inﬂation but not median inﬂation.
The relatively large fall in the median goes in the right direction for reducing the divergence
between actual and forecasted inﬂation over 2008-2010. Yet changing the deﬁnition of core
inﬂation is far from enough to resolve the puzzle in Figure 1. We also need another modiﬁcation
of the Phillips curve, which we turn to next.
4 A Phillips Curve With a Time-Varying Slope
As we have discussed, models of costly price adjustment provide a rationale for measuring core
inﬂation with median inﬂation. These models also imply time variation in the slope of the
Phillips curve. As shown by Ball, Mankiw, and Romer (1988), if nominal price adjustment
is costly, ﬁrms choose to adjust more frequently when the level of inﬂation is higher and the
variance of inﬂation is higher. More frequent nominal adjustment makes the aggregate price level
more ﬂexible, steepening the Phillips curve. That is, the unemployment coeﬃcient α increases
in absolute value with the level and variance of inﬂation.
Ball, Mankiw, and Romer present international evidence supporting their model. In a cross-
12country regression for 43 countries, the average level of inﬂation has a strong eﬀect on the
Phillips-curve slope. DeFina (1991) ﬁnds a similar eﬀect in U.S. time series data.
Here we document time-variation in the Phillips curve slope from 1960 through 2010. We
then show that this variation is tied closely to the level and variance of inﬂation, as predicted
by theory. Finally, we explore the implications for inﬂation during the Great Recession and in
the future.
4.1 Estimates of a Time-Varying Slope




(πt−1 + πt−2 + πt−3 + πt−4) + αt(u − u∗)t + ǫt (3)
αt = αt−1 + ηt
where ǫt and ηt are white noise errors with variances V and W respectively. This speciﬁcation
allows the coeﬃcient α to vary over time; speciﬁcally, it follows a random walk.
Equation (3) is a standard regression equation with a time-varying coeﬃcient. We estimate
two versions of this speciﬁcation. In the ﬁrst, we assume a value for the ratio of the two shock
variances, V and W. With this restriction, we can estimate the path of αt with the Kalman
smoother. We choose V/W to create a degree of smoothness in αt that appears plausible. Our
intuition is that ﬁrms’ price-setting policies, which determine the Phillips curve slope, do not
vary greatly from quarter to quarter. DeVeirman (2007) uses a similar approach to estimate a
time-varying Phillips curve slope for Japan.
In the second version of our procedure, we estimate the shock variances V and W along
with the path of αt. As suggested by Harvey (1989, Ch. 3) and Wright (2010), we choose the
two variances to maximize the likelihood produced by the Kalman smoother. This method is
roughly equivalent to choosing the variances to minimize one-step-ahead forecast errors from
the model.5
We estimate equation (3) for the period 1960-2010. For observations over 1984Q2-2010Q4,
5As a robustness check, we also estimate a time-varying α with a simpler technique: rolling regressions with
ﬁve-year windows. The qualitative results are the same.
13we measure inﬂation with the Cleveland Fed’s revised median. For 1968Q2-1984Q1, we use the
original median. For 1960Q1-1968Q1, when the median is not available, we use XFE inﬂation.
We obtain similar results when we use XFE inﬂation for the entire sample; the measurement of
core inﬂation is not critical for our results about the Phillips curve slope.
Figure 3 presents estimates of the path of αt, along with two-standard-error bands. Panel
A shows the results when the two shock variances are estimated freely, and Panel B imposes
the restriction that V/W, the ratio of the variances of ǫ and η, is 100. (Higher values of V/W
produce smoother series for α, and lower values produce more variable series.)
The two panels show the same broad trends in α: the estimated parameter falls from near
zero in 1960 to around -1 in the early 1970s, ﬂuctuates around this level until 1980, then rises
sharply and levels oﬀ in the neighborhood of -0.2. In the period since the mid-1980s–the second
half of the sample–the estimated α is quite stable. Given the standard errors, there is no evidence
against a constant α over 1985-2010.
4.2 Determinants of the Slope
Theory predicts that α is determined by the level and variance of inﬂation. Figure 4 tests this
idea by comparing the estimated path of α (smoothed with V/W = 100, and presented on
an inverted scale) to two series generated by the Stock-Watson IMA(1,1) model: the level of
permanent inﬂation, and the standard deviation of the sum of permanent and transitory shocks.
The results in Figure 4 are striking: the measures of the level and variability of inﬂation
move together, and the estimated path of α follows them closely. These results strongly conﬁrm
the predictions of sticky-price models about time-variation in α. In particular, the high and
variable inﬂation of the 1970s and early 80s created a steep Phillips curve; the curve was ﬂatter
before 1973 and after the Volcker disinﬂation, when inﬂation was relatively low and stable.
We can also capture these ideas with a regression. We assume that the coeﬃcient α is a
linear function of the other two series in Figure 4: αt = (a0+a1¯ πt+a2σt), where ¯ π and σ are the
level of permanent inﬂation and the standard deviation of shocks . Substituting this assumption




(πt−1 + πt−2 + πt−3 + πt−4) + a0(u − u∗)t + a1¯ πt(u − u∗)t + a2σt(u − u∗)t + ǫt (4)
Table 2 presents estimates of this equation for 1960-2010 and compares them to an equation
with a constant α. We measure ¯ πt and σt in two diﬀerent ways: with the quarterly series for these
parameters and with four-quarter moving averages. In both cases, the joint signiﬁcance of the ¯ π
and σ terms is high (p < 0.01). Unfortunately, the collinearity between the two variables makes
it diﬃcult to distinguish their individual roles: only ¯ π is signiﬁcant in one of our speciﬁcations,
and only σ is signiﬁcant in the other.
Many other authors present evidence that the Phillips-curve slope has changed over time;
examples include Roberts (2006) and Mishkin (2007). These authors focus on the decline in the
unemployment coeﬃcient since the 1980s, and generally give a diﬀerent explanation from ours:
they suggest that a ﬂatter Phillips curve reﬂects an anchoring of inﬂation expectations. We
question this view on two grounds. First, the theory is weak. When the Phillips curve is derived
from microeconomic foundations, the unemployment coeﬃcient is determined by the slope of
marginal cost and the frequency of price adjustment (Roberts, 1995). Anchoring inﬂuences
the expected-inﬂation term in the equation–an eﬀect we examine in Section 5–but not the
unemployment coeﬃcient. Second, the common explanation for anchoring is that Fed policy has
become more credible since the Volcker disinﬂation. This story does not explain why the Phillips
curve was ﬂat in the 1960s as well as the post-Volcker era, a result that the Ball-Mankiw-Romer
model does explain.
4.3 Estimating Constant Slopes for Subsamples
As noted above, the data suggest that α has been close to a constant since the early 1980s,
when inﬂation stabilized at a low level. Assuming a constant α will make it more tractable to
enrich the model along other dimensions. Therefore, we assume a constant α starting in 1985Q1,
roughly the end of the disinﬂation and high unemployment of the early 80s. We examine periods
15ending in 2007Q4 and 2010Q4 to check for eﬀects of the Great Recession.6
For comparison, we also estimate a constant α for the periods 1960-1972 and 1973-1984.
Figure 4 suggests some variation in α within these periods, but the statistical signiﬁcance of
this variation is borderline. α is generally low in absolute value during the ﬁrst period and high
during the second.
Table 3 presents estimates of α for each of the periods. We estimate equations with the output
gap as well as the unemployment gap, and with XFE inﬂation as well as median inﬂation. For
the ﬁrst period, 1960-1972, we only examine XFE inﬂation, because median inﬂation is not
available for most of the period. We measure median inﬂation with the original Cleveland Fed
series for 1973-84 and with the revised series for the periods beginning in 1985.7
For the ﬁrst three time periods in the table–covering the years from 1960 to the eve of the
ﬁnancial crisis–the estimated coeﬃcients are similar for the two inﬂation measures. The unem-
ployment coeﬃcient is around -0.2 or -0.25 for both 1960-1972 and 1985-2007. The coeﬃcient
is around -0.7 for the 1973-1984 period of high and volatile inﬂation. The coeﬃcients on output
are about -0.5 times the unemployment coeﬃcients, as suggested by Okun’s Law.
As before, multiplying the output coeﬃcient by 1.6 yields the long-run eﬀect on inﬂation of
a one percent output gap for a year. For 1985-2007, with inﬂation measured by the median, this
eﬀect is (1.6)(0.11) = 1.76. The sacriﬁce ratio is 1/(0.176), or about 6.
Extending the ﬁnal sample from 2007 to 2010 has diﬀerent eﬀects for the diﬀerent core
inﬂation measures. For XFE inﬂation, the coeﬃcients decline substantially in absolute value;
for median inﬂation, the coeﬃcients fall by less (when activity is measured by the unemployment
gap) or not at all (for the output gap). This diﬀerence suggests greater stability in the Phillips
curve when inﬂation is measured by the median, a result we will conﬁrm with dynamic forecasts.
6The results do not change signiﬁcantly if start the sample a year or two later. They are less robust when we
move the start date earlier, with observations before 1985 proving inﬂuential.
7Note that, in these regressions, we use the original median through 1985 even though the revised median
is available starting in 1983Q2. This choice ensures that our measure of median inﬂation is consistent over the
1973-1984 subsample.
164.4 The Great Recession and the Risk of Deﬂation
We now revisit the puzzle of inﬂation over 2008-2010. Figures 5 and 6 present dynamic fore-
casts of quarterly inﬂation based on the unemployment and output gaps over that period and
estimated Phillips curves for 1985-2007. Inﬂation is measured by the median in Figure 5 and by
XFE in Figure 6. Figures 7 and 8 show four-quarter averages of actual and forecasted inﬂation.
Figures 5 and 7 show that the forecasts for median inﬂation are close to actual inﬂation over
2008-2010–in contrast to Figure 2, there is no missing deﬂation. The most important reason
for this change in results is our allowance for time-variation in the Phillips curve slope. The
output and unemployment coeﬃcients for 1985-2007 are less than half as large as estimates for
the entire 1960-2007 period, which includes the high and unstable inﬂation of 1973-84. Smaller
coeﬃcients mean a smaller predicted fall in inﬂation.
The measurement of core inﬂation is also important. The forecasts of XFE inﬂation in
Figures 6 and 8 fall to around -1% at the end of 2010, signiﬁcantly below actual inﬂation.
Forecasted XFE inﬂation falls farther than forecasted median inﬂation because XFE inﬂation
starts at a lower level in 2007. In addition, the estimated coeﬃcients on unemployment and
output are somewhat larger for XFE over 1985-2007.
If our Phillips curve for median inﬂation ﬁts recent history, what does it imply for future
inﬂation? We address this question with new dynamic forecasts based on estimates of the
equation from 1985 through 2010. In this exercise, we assume that unemployment and the
natural rate follow the paths forecast by the CBO for 2011-2013: unemployment is 9.4% in
2011, 8.4% in 2012, and 7.6% in 2013, and the natural rate is constant at 5.2%. We also
compute dynamic forecasts based on CBO forecasts of the output gap over 2011-2013.
Figure 9 shows four-quarter averages of the resulting forecasts. Because unemployment
remains above the natural rate and output is below potential, inﬂation falls steadily. It becomes
negative at the end of 2011, and at the end of 2013 it reaches -1.9% (based on unemployment
forecasts) or -1.3% (based on output forecasts). Thus our Phillips curve, which explains why
deﬂation hasn’t occurred yet, also predicts that deﬂation will arrive soon.
174.5 Robustness
We have checked the robustness of our results along several dimensions. Speciﬁcally, we
• Add lags of unemployment and longer lags of inﬂation to the Phillips curve, as suggested
by Gordon (2011).
• Try Stock and Watson (2010)’s unemployment-gap variable (the diﬀerence between current
unemployment and minimum unemployment over the current and previous eleven quarters)
as an activity measure.
• Try Debelle and Laxton (1997)’s nonlinear transformation of unemployment as our activity
variable.
• Add Ball and Moﬃtt (2001)’s measure of the acceleration of productivity growth to the
Phillips curve.
• Estimate a path of the natural rate u∗ jointly with the coeﬃcient in the Phillips curve,
rather than relying on CBO estimates of u∗.
• Estimate an equation for total inﬂation that includes a measure of supply shocks (the
diﬀerence between total inﬂation and median inﬂation), rather than estimating an equation
for core inﬂation.
None of these extensions has a signiﬁcant impact on our conclusions. The Appendix to this
paper provides details.
5 Anchored Expectations?
So far we have estimated Phillips curves based on the assumption that expected inﬂation equals
past inﬂation. A growing number of economists, including Mishkin (2007), Bernanke (2010),
and Kohn (2010), argue that this assumption, while once acceptable, has become untenable.
In their view, expectations have become “anchored” and therefore do not respond strongly to
past inﬂation. Anchoring has resulted from the public’s growing understanding that the Federal
Reserve is committed to low and stable inﬂation.
18Here we review past evidence on the anchoring of expectations and present new evidence.
We also examine the importance of anchoring for explaining inﬂation during the Great Recession
and for forecasting future inﬂation.
We distinguish between two kinds of anchoring, “shock anchoring” and “level anchoring.”
The ﬁrst means that transitory shocks to inﬂation are not passed into expectations or into future
inﬂation. The second means that expectations are tied to a particular level of inﬂation, such as
two percent. We ﬁnd strong evidence for shock anchoring since the early 1980s. Level anchoring
has occurred gradually and is incomplete, yet it may strongly inﬂuence future inﬂation.
5.1 Shock Anchoring
A consensus holds that the U.S. experienced a shift in monetary regime under Paul Volcker (e.g.,
Taylor, 1999; Clarida et al., 2000). Before Volcker, the Fed accommodated supply shocks and
price setters recognized this behavior. A shock that raised inﬂation raised expected inﬂation,
which fed into future inﬂation, and the Fed did not systematically oppose this process. Since
Volcker, however, the Fed has been committed to stable inﬂation. As a result, supply shocks do
not strongly aﬀect expectations or future inﬂation. Expectations have become shock-anchored.8
Previous empirical work presents evidence of shock anchoring. Sommer (2004), for example,
ﬁnds that supply shocks–measured either by changes in food and energy prices or by asymmetries
in price distributions–have strong eﬀects on inﬂation and on survey expectations of inﬂation
before 1979, but little eﬀect afterwards. Authors such as Hooker (2002) and Fuhrer et al. (2009)
report similar results.
We conﬁrm these ﬁndings with the exercise in Table 4. We estimate Phillips curves in which
core inﬂation depends on the unemployment gap and lagged inﬂation, but compare two versions
of lagged inﬂation: lagged core inﬂation and lagged total inﬂation. We interpret total inﬂation
as the sum of core and supply shocks. We measure core inﬂation with median inﬂation for the
periods 1973-1984 and 1985-2010, and with XFE inﬂation for 1960-1972.
The results are stark. For 1960-1972 and 1973-1984, the R
2 of the Phillips curve is higher
when it includes lagged total inﬂation. When both lagged total and lagged core are included, the
8Christiano and Gust (2000) formalize these ideas with a model of the “high inﬂation trap.”
19weight on lagged core is insigniﬁcant. For 1985-2010, these results are reversed. The estimated
weight on lagged core is 0.89.
For 1985-2010, we also examine the behavior of expected inﬂation as measured by one-year
forecasts from the Survey of Professional Forecasters (which are not available for earlier periods).
We regress expected inﬂation on an average of lagged core inﬂation and lagged total inﬂation,
and ﬁnd a weight on lagged core of 0.86 (with a standard error of 0.06).
Finally, for 1985-2010 we experiment with time-varying weights on lagged core and lagged
total inﬂation. We ﬁnd little variation: in equations for both actual and expected inﬂation, the
weights on lagged core inﬂation are consistently close to one. Shock anchoring is a stable feature
of the post-Volcker monetary regime.
5.2 Level Anchoring
Many recent discussions of anchoring suggest that expected inﬂation is tied to a particular
level–speciﬁcally, 2%. Economists such as Mishkin argue that the Fed is committed to keeping
inﬂation close to 2%, and that the public has come to understand this fact. This anchoring of
expectations pushes actual inﬂation toward 2% as well.
More precisely, Mishkin suggests that expectations of core PCE inﬂation are anchored at 2%.
Since 1980, core CPI inﬂation has exceeded core PCE by about 0.5% on average (for both the
weighted median and XFE measures of core). We should expect, therefore, that expectations of
core inﬂation are anchored at 2.5%.
Using rolling regressions, Williams (2006) and Fuhrer and Olivei (2010) ﬁnd that the coef-
ﬁcients on inﬂation lags in the Phillips curve, when not constrained to sum to one, have fallen
over time. This ﬁnding is consistent with the level anchoring of expectations. We add to this
evidence by estimating the degrees of anchoring of both expected and actual inﬂation and how
these parameters have evolved over time. One innovation is that we impose a speciﬁc level-2.5%–
at which inﬂation is anchored if it is anchored at all.
While shock anchoring dates back to the Volcker regime shift, level anchoring is more recent.
The idea that the Fed has an inﬂation target around 2% was ﬁrst discussed in the early 1990s
(e.g. Taylor, 1993) and slowly became more prominent. To capture this history, we use data
20from 1985 through 2010 to estimate
πe
t = δt2.5 + (1 − δt)
1
4
(πt−1 + πt−2 + πt−3 + πt−4) + ǫt (5)
where δt follows a random walk. Expected inﬂation is an average of lagged inﬂation and 2.5%,
with time-varying weights. When δ = 0, expectations are purely backward-looking; when δ = 1,
expectations are fully anchored at 2.5%.
To estimate equation (5), we measure πe with SPF forecasts for inﬂation over the next four
quarters. We measure past inﬂation with the Cleveland Fed median. We estimate the path
of δt using the Kalman smoother, assuming that the variance of ǫ is 100 times the variance of
innovations in δ.
Figure 10 presents our estimated series for δt We ﬁnd that δt is near zero until the early
1990s and then rises. It is around 0.6 over 2007-2010. Expectations have become largely but
not completely anchored.
We next examine the behavior of actual inﬂation. We assume that inﬂation depends on
expected inﬂation and the unemployment gap, equation (1), and substitute in equation (5) for
expected inﬂation. The result is
πt = δt2.5 + (1 − δt)
1
4
(πt−1 + πt−2 + πt−3 + πt−4) + α(u − u∗
t) + ǫt (6)
We estimate this equation and a variation with the output gap replacing the unemployment gap.
Figures 11 and 12 shows the estimated path of δt for these speciﬁcations. Once again, δ is near
zero until the early 1990s and then rises. According to these results, as inﬂation expectations
have become anchored, so has actual inﬂation.
The value of δ in 2010Q4, the end of the sample, is 0.47 when the Phillips curve includes
the unemployment gap and 0.30 with the output gap. These δs are smaller than the degree
of anchoring that we estimate for SPF expectations in Figure 10. One possible explanation is
that the expectations that enter the Phillips curve are those of typical price setters, who are less
sophisticated than professional forecasters. They learn more slowly about the Fed’s commitment
to 2.5% inﬂation. But we should not make too much of the diﬀerences among Figures 10-12,
21because the conﬁdence intervals for the δs overlap.
Our estimates of the coeﬃcient α in equation (6) is -0.24 (standard error = 0.03) for the
unemployment gap and 0.13 (standard error = 0.02) for the output gap. These estimates are
somewhat larger in absolute value than the αs for our basic Phillips curve, which includes lagged
inﬂation with a coeﬃcient of one–but again, the conﬁdence intervals overlap.
5.3 Dynamic Forecasts
We now revisit the behavior of inﬂation in the recent past and the future. Figure 13 parallels
Figure 7: it presents dynamic forecasts of four-quarter inﬂation over 2008-2010, based on es-
timates of equation (6) for 1985-2007. We assume that, throughout 2008-2010, the anchoring
parameter δ remains at the level estimated for 2007Q4; this level is 0.31 when the equation
includes the unemployment gap and 0.26 with the output gap.
In Figure 13, forecasted inﬂation falls less than actual inﬂation over 2008-2010. The forecasts
from our purely backward-looking equation, shown in Figure 7, are closer to actual inﬂation.
This diﬀerence in forecast performance, however, is modest in size and statistically insigniﬁcant:
accounting for anchoring does not sharply change inﬂation forecasts for the last few years. This
ﬁnding reﬂects the fact that the estimated degree of anchoring in 2007Q4 is fairly small. In
addition, inﬂation has been fairly close to 2.5%, so forecasts are not sensitive to the weights on
2.5% and lagged inﬂation.
Figure 14 parallels Figure 9 for our basic Phillips curve. It shows forecasts of four-quarter
inﬂation over 2011-2013 based on estimates of equation (6) for 1985-2010. Here we assume that
δ stays at the level estimated for 2010Q4.
In this exercise, anchoring makes a big diﬀerence. Deﬂation, which is predicted by our basic
Phillips curve, does not occur in our forecasts with anchoring. Instead, inﬂation is steady at
about 0.5% and then rises to 1% at the end of 2013. Partial anchoring pulls expected inﬂation
up toward 2.5%, and that causes actual inﬂation to bottom out rather than fall in response to
high unemployment.
Two caveats are in order. First, there is considerable uncertainty about the degree of an-
choring in the Phillips curve. With unemployment in the equation, the 95% conﬁdence interval
22for δ in 2010Q4 is roughly [0.2, 0.7]. With the output gap, the conﬁdence interval is [0.2, 0.4].
Second, even if expectations were anchored in 2010, they may become less anchored in the
near future. The weight on 2.5% rose during a period when actual inﬂation was near that level.
In contrast, Figure 14 tells us that actual inﬂation will stay below 1% for several years–yet
expectations will still be tied to 2.5%. That suggests sub-optimal forecasting. Price setters may
learn that inﬂation is stuck below 2.5%, and expectations will adjust downward.
Believers in anchoring point out that long run inﬂation expectations–as measured, for ex-
ample, by ten-year SPF forecasts–have been close to 2.5% since 2000. It is plausible that these
expectations will remain anchored in the future, because the public believes that the Fed will
manage eventually to return inﬂation to its 2.5% target. However, in most theories of the Phillips
curve–both sticky-price and sticky-information models–prices depend on expected inﬂation over
the period when the prices are likely to be in eﬀect. This period is on the order of one year
rather than ten years. Recent empirical work also ﬁnds that actual inﬂation depends on one-year
rather than ten-year SPF expectations (Fuhrer, 2011).
The forecasts of inﬂation in Figure 14 are fairly close to the forecasts of others. At the end
of 2010, the CBO was forecasting core CPI inﬂation rates of 0.9%, 1.0%, and 1.4% over 2011-
2013. These forecasts are 0.3 to 0.5 percentage points above ours. These diﬀerences might be
explained by the deﬁnitions of core inﬂation-median for us and XFE for the CBO (although it
is not obvious that forecasts of either should be higher than the other). In the SPF, the median
forecast for XFE inﬂation is 1.3% for 2011 and 1.7% for 2012 (and unavailable for 2013). The
forecast for 2012 is a full percentage point above ours. One factor here is that only 44 percent of
SPF forecasters say they use the concept of the natural rate of unemployment. Evidently, many
forecasters use models of inﬂation that diﬀer greatly from the Phillips curves we estimate.
6 The New Keynesian Phillips Curve
We have followed an empirical tradition that assumes expected inﬂation is determined by past in-
ﬂation and possibly the central bank’s inﬂation target. Another literature studies Phillips curves
based on rational expectations. The foundation for much of this work is the “New Keynesian
23Phillips Curve” (NKPC) derived from Calvo (1983)’s model of staggered price adjustment. The
original version of this equation, presented by Roberts (1995), was:
πt = Etπt+1 + λ(y − y∗)t (7)
where Etπt+1 is this quarter’s rational forecast of next quarter’s inﬂation and y−y∗ is the output
gap.
A number of authors show that this Phillips curve ﬁts the data poorly (e.g. Gali and Gertler,
1999; Mankiw, 2001). To understand this result, rearrange equation (7) to obtain
Etπt+1 − πt = −λ(y − y∗)t (8)
The theory behind the NKPC implies that the parameter λ is positive. Therefore, equation (8)
says that the output gap in quarter t has a negative eﬀect on the expected change in inﬂation
from t to t+1. In the data, output has a positive correlation with the change in inﬂation–both
before the Great Recession and during it, when output was low and inﬂation fell. As a result,
estimates of λ are consistently negative, contradicting the theory.
Motivated by this ﬁnding, Gali and Gertler modify the NKPC by replacing the output gap
with real marginal cost:
πt = Etπt+1 + λmct (9)
Gali and Gertler measure real marginal cost with real unit labor costs, also known as labor’s
share of income. They obtain a positive estimate of λ, a result that has led many researchers to
adopt their speciﬁcation.
Rudd and Whelan (2005, 2007) and Mazumder (2010) criticize Gali and Gertler’s work.
They argue that labor’s share of income is not a credible measure of real marginal cost. Labor’s
share is generally countercyclical, and there is a strong case for procyclical marginal cost based
on both theory and evidence, such as the Bils (1987) and Mazumder studies of overtime labor.
Mazumder estimates equation (9) with a procyclical measure of marginal cost based on overtime,
24and obtains negative estimates of λ–the same result that discredited the original NKPC.9
Despite skepticism about the NKPC, we ask whether it helps explain inﬂation during the
Great Recession. It does not; indeed, recent experience provides a new reason to doubt the
model. The problem is diﬀerent from the one stressed in previous work: the Gali-Gertler
speciﬁcation does not ﬁt recent data even if we accept their measure of marginal cost.
Table 5 presents estimates of the parameter λ in the NKPC, with marginal cost measured by
labor’s share. We estimate the equation by GMM using the following orthogonality condition:
Et{(πt − λmct − πt+1)}zt = 0 (10)
where zt is a vector of variables dated t and earlier, thus these variables are orthogonal to the
inﬂation surprise in t + 1. We use the same instruments as Gali and Gertler: four lags each of
inﬂation, labor’s share, the output gap, a long-short interest rate spread, nominal wage inﬂation,
and commodity price inﬂation. We use the median CPI inﬂation rate, but the results are similar
for other inﬂation measures (including Gali and Gertler’s measure, the GDP deﬂator).10
As in previous parts of this paper, we ﬁnd that the coeﬃcient in the Phillips curve varies
across time periods. Gali and Gertler report a signiﬁcantly positive coeﬃcient for 1960-1997,
which ﬁts theory, and which we replicate. The noteworthy result in Table 5 is that the coeﬃcient
on labor’s share is signiﬁcantly positive for the period 1985-2007 (t = 2.04), but insigniﬁcant for
1985-2010 (t = 0.92). In other words the model’s ﬁt deteriorates when we add 2008-2010 to the
sample.
Figure 15 shows why. For 1985-2010, it plots annual averages of labor’s share of income
against the unemployment gap. We see that 2009 and 2010 are big outliers. Before then,
labor’s share was positively correlated with the unemployment gap–as noted before, it was
countercyclical. This is an unappealing feature for a marginal cost measure, but it produces a
positive estimate of λ. The Great Recession, unlike previous recessions, has been accompanied
9Rudd and Whelan and Kleibergen and Mavroeidis (2009) also demonstrate technical problems with the studies
supporting the Gali-Gertler model, such as weak instruments.
10More precisely, we use the inﬂation series we constructed to estimate the accelerationist Phillips curve over
1960-2010: the Cleveland Fed’s revised median for 1983-2010, the original median for 1968-1982, and XFE inﬂation
for 1960-1967.
25by a sharp fall in labor’s share–for whatever reason, productivity growth was strong and real
wages did not keep up. This change in cyclicality changes the estimate of the Phillips curve
coeﬃcient.
To see the problem a diﬀerent way, we substitute mc for the output gap in equation (8):
Etπt+1 − πt = −λmct (11)
This version of Gali and Gertler’s equation says that the expected change in inﬂation depends
negatively on labor’s share. Throughout 2009 and 2010, when labor’s share was lower than
average, the equation says that inﬂation was expected to rise. In fact, inﬂation fell, and it seems
dubious that price setters repeatedly expected the opposite–that inﬂation would rise during
the Great Recession. In any case, in quarterly data, falling inﬂation and expectations of rising
inﬂation imply repeated forecast errors in the same direction, a violation of rational expectations.
7 Conclusion
This paper examines U.S. inﬂation from 1960 through 2010. We ﬁnd that a simple accelerationist
Phillips curve ﬁts the entire period, including the recent Great Recession, under two conditions:
we measure core inﬂation with the weighted median of price changes, and we allow the Phillips
curve slope to change with the level and variance of inﬂation. Both of these ideas are motivated
by models of costly price adjustment.
We also ﬁnd evidence of a change in the Phillips curve since the 1990s: expectations of
inﬂation, and hence actual inﬂation, have become partially anchored at a level of 2.5%. If
this anchoring persists, the United States is likely to avoid deﬂation in the near future, despite
high unemployment. Deﬂation may occur, however, if low inﬂation leads to a de-anchoring of
expectations.
We conclude with a topic for future research: the eﬀect of unemployment duration on the
Phillips curve. For a number of countries, Llaudes (2005) ﬁnds that long-term unemployment
(the fraction of the labor force unemployed for more than 26 weeks) puts less downward pressure
on inﬂation than short-term unemployment. It is diﬃcult to test this idea with U.S. data because
26long-term and short-term unemployment are highly collinear. This collinearity is diminishing,
however, because long-term unemployment has risen much more than short-term unemployment
since 2008.We may soon have enough data to tell whether long-term unemployment has less eﬀect
on inﬂation. If it does, then inﬂation will fall by less over the next few years than one would
expect based on aggregate unemployment. The shift toward long-term unemployment, along
with expectations anchoring, could prevent deﬂation.
27A Appendix
Here we brieﬂy discuss ﬁve variations to our basic Phillips curve speciﬁcation that we also test
for robustness.
A.1 Longer Lags
Gordon (2011) argues that the Phillips curve ﬁts history better if it includes lags of unemploy-
ment and long lags of inﬂation. Following Gordon, we modify our basic Phillips curve, equation
(1), by including four lags of unemployment and twenty-four lags of inﬂation (with the sum of
coeﬃcients on the inﬂation lags set to one). We continue to measure inﬂation with the Cleve-
land Fed median. When we estimate this speciﬁcation for the period 1960-2007,11 the sum of
unemployment coeﬃcients is -0.26. Paralleling Figure 7, Figure A1 shows dynamic forecasts
of four-quarter inﬂation over 2008-2010. The forecast for 2010Q4 is -5.1%. Thus, our ﬁnding
that the pre-2008 Phillips curve incorrectly predicts deﬂation is robust to the equation’s lag
structure.
A.2 The Stock-Watson Unemployment Gap
Stock and Watson (2010) compute a new unemployment gap variable deﬁned as the diﬀerence
between the unemployment rate in quarter t and the minimum unemployment rate from quarters
t to t − 11:
uSW
t = ut − min(ut,..,ut−11) (A-1)
Computing the gap variable in this way focuses on recessions by producing only non-negative
values for the unemployment gap. Tables A1(a) and A1(b) compare the results of our basic
Phillips curve speciﬁcation for the CBO unemployment gap and the Stock-Watson unemploy-
ment gap. These results show a very similar Phillips curve is produced when either (u − u∗)
or uSW are used in turn in the model. We then estimate a version of the Phillips curve that
11Data on core inﬂation starts in 1957, therefore this regression actually starts in 1964.




(πt−1 + πt−2 + πt−3 + πt−4) + (β0 + β1D1t + β2D2t)((u − u∗)t + λuSW
t ) (A-2)
where D1t is a dummy variable equal to 1 for 1973:1-2010:4 (0 otherwise), and D2t is a dummy
variable equal to 1 for 1985:1-2010:4 (0 otherwise). This model is estimated from 1960:1 to
2010:4, and allows us to compare the statistical signiﬁcance of the two unemployment gap
variables at the same time. Speciﬁcally we estimate the model jointly while also imposing the
restriction that the ratio of the coeﬃcients on the two variables is the same for every period.
We are able to do this since there is no obvious reason to believe that the relative importance
of (u − u∗) and uSW changes, even though the coeﬃcient on the activity variable itself should
change over diﬀerent time periods.
The results (Table A1(c)) suggest that the Stock-Watson unemployment gap does not add
much to the explanatory power of our equation. The weight on the Stock-Watson unemployment
gap is not statistically signiﬁcant, leading us to believe that the Stock-Watson variable is not
useful for our purposes (but might be better suited to real-time forecasting as Stock and Watson
(2010) originally intended it for).
A.3 A Nonlinear Phillips Curve
Debelle and Laxton (1997) estimate both linear and nonlinear Phillips curves for Canada, the
United Kingdom, and the United States, and argue that a nonlinear speciﬁcation ﬁts the data
better. The equation that Debelle and Laxton estimate essentially replaces the unemployment








Table A1(d) presents estimates of equation (A-3) for our three main sample periods. The ﬁt of
the equation, as measured by the R
2s, is very close to the ﬁt of our linear Phillips curve, equation
(2). We have also estimated a Phillips curve that includes both (u − u∗) and (u − u∗)/u. In
this case, high collinearity between the two variables causes both to be statistically insigniﬁcant.
29Thus, the data do not suggest that making the Phillips curve nonlinear improves the model.
When we estimate the Debelle-Laxton version of the Phillips curve from 1985-2007 and
compute dynamic forecasts of inﬂation for 2008-2010, the model performs less well than our
linear speciﬁcation. The four-quarter average of median inﬂation fell from 3.1% to 0.5% from
2007Q4 to 2010Q4, whereas the Debelle-Laxton model predicts four-quarter inﬂation of 1.3% in
2010Q4. The forecast from the linear model, 0.3%, is closer to actual inﬂation.
A.4 Productivity Growth
Ball and Moﬃtt (2001) argue that the ﬁt of the Phillips curve can be improved by adding the
change in productivity growth, g−b g. They explain this eﬀect with a model in which workers’ real
wage aspirations adjust slowly to shifts in productivity growth. As a result, an acceleration of
productivity growth means that productivity growth is high relative to wage demands, thereby
reducing the natural rate of unemployment. Likewise a productivity slowdown does the reverse.
Therefore we also estimate a version of the Philips curve which adds g − b g to our basic
speciﬁcation, where g is labor productivity in the business sector (output divided by total hours
of work) and b g is a weighted average of past productivity growth deﬁned recursively by a partial
adjustment equation, b gt =  b gt−1 + (1 −  )gt−1. Ball and Moﬃtt suggest a value of   of 0.95
yields a good ﬁt to annual data. We therefore use the quarterly analog of 0.9875.
The results in Table A1(e) suggest that the productivity growth variable is insigniﬁcant for
1960-1972 and 1973-1984. It is however signiﬁcant for 1985-2010 and adds modestly to the R
2.
However it does not substantially change our interpretation of the period 2008-2010. Computing
dynamic forecast based on estimates for 1985 to 2007 with g − b g included are very similar to
those that ignore g − b g: median inﬂation is forecast to fall to -0.32% by the fourth quarter of
2010, which is close to the predicted fall to -0.24% in our basic speciﬁcation.
A.5 Estimating A Time-Varying NAIRU
The way in which the NAIRU is computed is often a contentious issue in the literature, though
for the purposes of this paper we view the CBO estimate of the NAIRU as close as we can get to a
measure that captures a pattern common in other estimates. That being said, for robustness we
30also check what happens to our results when we alter the way in which the NAIRU is estimated.
Speciﬁcally we compute the NAIRU in a similar manner as in Staiger et al. (1997). We
estimate the Phillips curve model with median CPI inﬂation and lagged median CPI inﬂation,
where the NAIRU is modeled as a random walk. Just as in Section 4 of the paper, we derive
maximum likelihood estimates of the path of the NAIRU using the Kalman ﬁlter with the
restriction that V/W is equal to 400.
This produces a series for the NAIRU that is very close to the CBO estimate of the NAIRU.
For instance in 1985:1, the CBO estimate of the NAIRU is 6.03% and it falls to 5.20% by the end
of 2010. Over the exact same time period our estimate of the time-varying NAIRU goes from
6.04% at the start of 1985 to 5.44% by the end of 2010. In fact comparing all quarters from 1985
to 2010, the deviation between the CBO estimate of the NAIRU and our time-varying NAIRU
never exceeds 0.32%. Finally, we also estimate our basic speciﬁcation of median inﬂation on
lagged median inﬂation and the unemployment gap using the new NAIRU estimate. We obtain
a coeﬃcient of the unemployment gap of -0.178, which is extremely close to the coeﬃcient
obtained under the CBO unemployment gap of -0.168. Therefore we conclude that our results
are robust to alternative measures of the NAIRU.
A.6 Supply Shocks
An alternative to estimating the Phillips curve with core inﬂation is to use total CPI inﬂation
and incorporate measures of supply shocks. We follow Ball and Mankiw (1995) by deﬁning a
supply shock as the diﬀerence of current inﬂation from current core inﬂation which captures
asymmetries in the distribution of price changes. Thus our supply shock becomes total CPI





(πt−1 + πt−2 + πt−3 + πt−4) + α(u − u∗)t + βShockt + ǫt (A-4)
where Shock is equal to total inﬂation minus core inﬂation, πT denotes total CPI inﬂation,
and π denotes median CPI inﬂation. Table A1(f) shows the results for the periods 1973-1984,
1985-2007, and 1985-2010. The interesting result to note here is that the coeﬃcient on the
31supply shock variable is approximately equal to one in all periods, particularly for 1985-2007





(πt−1 + πt−2 + πt−3 + πt−4) + α(u − u∗)t + (πT
t − πt) (A-5)




(πt−1 + πt−2 + πt−3 + πt−4) + α(u − u∗)t (A-6)
which is exactly our basic speciﬁcation for the Phillips curve. In other words, the behavior of total
inﬂation in the presence of supply shocks is consistent with the behavior of core inﬂation that
we assumed previously. Since the estimated equations for total inﬂation reduce approximately
to our equations for core inﬂation, our estimates for the coeﬃcient α are similar for the two
types of equations for a given time period and activity gap.
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37Table 1: Phillips Curve Estimated from 1960:1 to 2007:4
(a) πt = 1
4(πt−1 + πt−2 + πt−3 + πt−4) + α(ut − u∗
t)
(b) πt = 1
4(πt−1 + πt−2 + πt−3 + πt−4) + α(yt − y∗
t)
(a) Unemployment Gap (b) Output Gap
πt measure: TOTAL CPI XFE CPI TOTAL CPI XFE CPI
Coeﬃcient for α -0.507 -0.474 0.308 0.257
S.E. (0.091) (0.077) (0.049) (0.042)
R
2
0.703 0.746 0.713 0.744
Note: πt is the inﬂation rate, ut is the national unemployment rate, u
∗
t is the CBO measure of the NAIRU, yt is
log of real GDP, and y
∗
t is the CBO’s estimate of potential (log) real GDP. Estimation is conducted by OLS.
38Table 2: Phillips Curve with Level and Variance of Inﬂation
(a) πt = 1







(b) πt = 1
4(πt−1 + πt−2 + πt−3 + πt−4) + a0(u − u∗)t + a1¯ πt(u − u∗)t + a2σt(u − u∗)t + ǫt
Quarterly Data for ¯ πt, σt
a0 a1 a2
Coeﬃcient 0.194 -0.008 -0.645




p-value for H0 : a1 = a2 = 0 0.000
4-Quarter Moving Averages for ¯ πt, σt
a0 a1 a2
Coeﬃcient 0.132 -0.134 -0.008




p-value for H0 : a1 = a2 = 0 0.000
Note: Time period for results in this table is 1960:1-2010:4. ¯ π and σ are the level of permanent inﬂation and the
standard deviation of shocks.
39Table 3: Phillips Curves for Core Inﬂation
(a) πt = 1
4(πt−1 + πt−2 + πt−3 + πt−4) + α(ut − u∗
t)
(b) πt = 1
4(πt−1 + πt−2 + πt−3 + πt−4) + α(yt − y∗
t)
(a) Unemployment Gap (b) Output Gap
πt measure: MEDIAN CPI XFE CPI MEDIAN CPI XFE CPI
1960:1-1972:4





S.E. of Regression 0.992 0.985
1973:1-1984:4
Coeﬃcient for α -0.650 -0.688 0.365 0.371
S.E. (0.172) (0.184) (0.095) (0.103)
R
2
0.513 0.402 0.516 0.391
S.E. of Regression 2.254 2.408 2.247 2.429
1985:1-2007:4
Coeﬃcient for α -0.202 -0.246 0.114 0.136
S.E. (0.054) (0.067) (0.029) (0.037)
R
2
0.700 0.761 0.703 0.763
S.E. of Regression 0.425 0.529 0.423 0.528
1985:1-2010:4
Coeﬃcient for α -0.168 -0.136 0.114 0.092
S.E. (0.031) (0.039) (0.019) (0.024)
R
2
0.781 0.764 0.792 0.769
S.E. of Regression 0.448 0.570 0.437 0.563
Note: Median CPI inﬂation data begins in 1967:2.
40Table 4: Shock Anchoring in the Phillips Curve
(a) πt =
1




Coeﬃcient for α -0.231 -0.650 -0.168


















Coeﬃcient for α -0.319 -0.620 -0.003




(c) πt = γ
1














Coeﬃcient for α -0.329 -0.630 -0.150
SE (0.095) (0.165) (0.031)
Coeﬃcient for γ -0.117 0.326 0.886




Note: πt is core inﬂation (XFE inﬂation for 1960:1-1972:4, and median inﬂation for 1973:1-2010:4), and π
T
t is the
total CPI inﬂation rate.
41Table 5: New Keynesian Phillips Curve Results
πt = Etπt+1 + λst
1960:1-1997:4 1960:1-2010:4 1960:1-1972:4
Coeﬃcient for λ 0.060 0.040 0.110





Coeﬃcient for λ 0.129 0.044 0.012




Note: In this table we again use the combined median inﬂation rate that uses the revised median series from
1983-2010, the original median series for 1967-1982, and XFE for 1960-1967. st is the log of the labor income
share. For the rational expectations Phillips curve we use GMM with instruments of: four lags of inﬂation,
the labor share, the output gap, a long-short interest rate spread, nominal wage inﬂation, and commodity price
inﬂation.
42A1. Variations on Basic Phillips Curves
(a) πt = 1
4(πt−1 + πt−2 + πt−3 + πt−4) + α(ut − u∗
t)
1960:1-1972:4 1973:1-1984:4 1985:1-2010:4
Coeﬃcient for α -0.231 -0.650 -0.168




(b) πt = 1
4(πt−1 + πt−2 + πt−3 + πt−4) + αuSW
t
1960:1-1972:4 1973:1-1984:4 1985:1-2010:4
Coeﬃcient for α -0.296 -0.521 -0.157




(c) πt = 1
4(πt−1 + πt−2 + πt−3 + πt−4) + (β0 + β1D1t + β2D2t)((u − u∗)t + λuSW
t )
1960:1-2010:4
β0 β1 β2 λ
Coeﬃcient -0.259 -0.258 0.381 0.269
SE (0.125) (0.189) (0.141) (0.340)
R
2 0.788
(d) πt = 1




Coeﬃcient for α -0.965 -5.836 -1.312




(e) πt = 1
4(πt−1 + πt−2 + πt−3 + πt−4) + α(ut − u∗
t) + β(gt − b gt)
1960:1-1972:4 1973:1-1984:4 1985:1-2010:4
Coeﬃcient for α -0.224 -0.636 -0.158
SE (0.105) (0.172) (0.030)
Coeﬃcient for β -0.014 -0.096 -0.049
SE (0.033) (0.085) (0.016)
R
2 0.724 0.515 0.798
(f) πT
t = 1
4(πt−1 + πt−2 + πt−3 + πt−4) + α(ut − u∗
t) + βShockt
1973:1-1984:4 1985:1-2007:4 1985:1-2010:4
Coeﬃcient for α -0.667 -0.194 -0.167
SE (0.175) (0.055) (0.030)
Coeﬃcient for β 0.852 1.031 1.038




Note: ut is the national unemployment rate, u
∗
t is the CBO measure of the NAIRU, and u
SW
t is the diﬀerence
from unemployment in quarter t from the minimum unemployment rate from quarter t to t−11. D1 is a dummy
variable equal to 1 for 1973:1 to 2010:4 (0 otherwise), and D2 is a dummy variable equal to 1 for 1985:1 to 2010:4
(0 otherwise). For Tables (a), (b), (d), and (e) πt is XFE inﬂation for 1960:1-1972:4, and is median CPI inﬂation
for subsequent periods. For Table (c), we use a combined median inﬂation rate that uses the ‘revised’ median
series from 1983-2010, the ‘original’ median series for 1967-1982, and XFE for 1960-1967. For Table (f), total CPI
inﬂation is used as dependent variable with median inﬂation for the lagged inﬂation term on the right-hand side,
and Shockt is total CPI inﬂation minus median CPI inﬂation.
43Figure 1: 4-Quarter Moving Averages of Dynamic Forecasts of Inﬂation for 2008 to 2010 Based
on 1960:1-2007:4 Regression
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44Figure 2: Median CPI and XFE CPI Inﬂation Rates, 1983:2-2010:4






















































































































































































































































Actual Inflation Permanent Component
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Permanent Component of Inflation SE times 10 !alpha





























































































































































































































































































































































































































Actual Inflation Dynamic Forecast
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50Figure 9: 4-Quarter Moving Averages of Dynamic Forecast of Median CPI Inﬂation for 2011 to
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Figure 10: Level Anchoring based on SPF4Q = δt2.5 + (1 − δt)1







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































52Figure 13: 4-Quarter Moving Averages of Dynamic Forecasts of Median CPI Inﬂation for 2008
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Figure 14: 4-Quarter Moving Averages of Dynamic Forecasts of Median CPI Inﬂation for 2011
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Figure A1: 4-Quarter Moving Averages of Dynamic Forecasts of Median CPI Inﬂation for 2008
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